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This paper is a revised version of DP02-E-005, where the mathematical structure of 
the model in this paper is substantially different from the previous one.   
The finding that countries that take a slow approach to reform during a financial crisis 
run into problems of persistent stagnation is usually explained as follows: Forbearance 
policy (i.e., an implicit subsidy to inefficient sectors) distorts resource allocation, 
causing a supply shortage of resources to the productive sectors. I propose another 
explanation: Forbearance impedes the recovery o f  c o n f i d e n c e  t h a t  i s  l o s t  d u r i n g  a  
financial crisis. 
If confidence is restored through Bayesian learning by economic agents based on 
observations of government actions, then the inaction of the government (forbearance) 
impedes Bayesian learning. The model shows that forbearance policy delays economic 
recovery. 
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∗ This paper is a revised version of the previous discussion paper DP02-E-005. The qualitative 
results are identical to those in the previous version, but the mathematical method is substantially 
different. In the previous version, I make use of the notion of the Knightian Uncertainty, while in 
the present version, I derive the same results using the notion of risk, which is much more popular 
in the literature. 1 Introduction
Many countries have experienced ﬁnancial crises. Recent research indicates that a quick
policy response (e.g., resolving nonperforming loans, recapitalizing the banking sector,
reorganizing failed ﬁrms) will be followed by quick recovery of economic growth. For
example, Bergoeing et al. (2002) compare the quick and sustained recovery of Chile
with the long stagnation of Mexico after the external debt crises at the beginning of
the 1980s. They show that although both macroeconomic policies and the international
trade environment were favorable for Mexico, Chile recovered at a higher rate and with
long-lasting economic growth. They argue that what caused the diﬀerent outcomes are:
(1) the diﬀerent policy reactions to the banking sectors; and (2) the diﬀerence in the
eﬃciency of bankruptcy procedures. Chile undertook quick banking reforms devoting
the equivalent of 35% of its annual GDP from 1982—86, while Mexico nationalized banks
and allocated credit at discretionary below-market rates for a long time. The Chilean
bankruptcy procedure had become quite eﬃcient by the time of the 1982 bankruptcy
reform law, while Mexico had an obsolete and ineﬃcient bankruptcy law in place from
1943 to 2000. Bergoeing et al. conclude that these diﬀerences in banking reform and
bankruptcy procedures account for the diﬀerences in economic growth subsequent to the
debt crises in the two countries.
Other episodes of ﬁnancial crisis include the bursting of asset-price bubbles in Sweden
and Japan in the early 1990s. Both Sweden and Japan experienced price declines in
their real estate markets at the beginning of the 1990s. Sweden quickly disposed of
nonperforming loans and recapitalized the banking sector from 1992—94, while Japan
delayed the resolution of nonperforming loans until 1997. Asset prices in Sweden picked
up in 1994 and have continued to rise, while asset prices in Japan have continued to
fall for more than a decade. The observation that quick reform seems to produce quick
economic recovery is usually explained as follows: forbearance (i.e., an implicit subsidy
to ineﬃcient sectors) causes ineﬃcient allocation of economic resources; the resources are
absorbed by ineﬃcient sectors, while productive sectors are starved of resources for their
activities. Thus, macroeconomic ineﬃciency is usually explained as a shortage of supply
2of economic resources in productive sectors.
Ap u z z l e O n ep u z z l ei st h ec a s eo ft h eJ a p a n e s ee c o n o m y . A l t h o u g hf o r b e a r a n c e
lending to de facto insolvent ﬁrms has been widespread among Japanese banks, these
banks still have a huge number of deposits that they feel compelled to invest in Japanese
government bonds. This indicates that Japanese banks have had enough money to lend
to borrowers who were potentially productive; there was no shortage of resources. Thus,
Japanese banks must have been unable to ﬁnd productive borrowers during the 1990s. In
other words, Japanese ﬁrms seem to have ceased undertaking productive projects after
the collapse of the asset-price bubble at the beginning of the 1990s. We need to clarify
why the Japanese corporate sector did not undertake productive projects despite having
suﬃcient funds to do so.
I argue in this paper that forbearance of economic reform impedes the rebuilding of
the conﬁdence lost during a ﬁnancial crisis. In a ﬁnancial crisis, losses emerge (due to
asset-price declines or devaluation of domestic currency) that are unexpected beforehand
and should be clariﬁed and borne by banks and ﬁrms. If the government expects that
asset prices (or domestic currency) will regain value following a spontaneous economic
recovery, then it rationally chooses to postpone the reckoning to avoid the social and
political costs of a rash of bankruptcies. Suppose, however, that economic recovery de-
pends upon an increase in high-risk, high-return investments and that investments will
increase only if the public’s conﬁdence is restored, while the conﬁdence people have is
based largely on their shared belief in the ﬁrmness and fairness of bankruptcy proce-
dures. Let us assume that people’s conﬁdence obeys a Bayesian learning rule based on
observations of the government’s actions toward failed ﬁrms and banks. In this case, if
the government chooses forbearance, conﬁdence may not be restored and business invest-
ment may stagnate. (If the government acts to postpone bankruptcies, peoples’ belief
in bankruptcy procedures will not be restored.) If the government recognizes that conﬁ-
dence depends on the public’s evaluation of the government’s action, it will choose not to
procrastinate in situations where conﬁdence matters. If the government perceives that
3a change in conﬁdence is an exogenous event, however, it may choose procrastination,
leading the economy into protracted stagnation.
Uncertainty associated with a ﬁnancial crisis In order to formalize this conﬁdence-
rebuilding hypothesis as a theoretical model, we can utilize the Bayesian learning mecha-
nism in the spirit of Barro (1986). The unique characteristic of the expectation problem
after a ﬁnancial crisis is that we need to analyze the expectations of economic agents
in a context of unprecedented events. For example, land prices in Japan had continued
to rise for some 50 years until the beginning of the 1990s. The continuous decline in
land prices over the subsequent decade was unprecedented. Economic institutions and
b u s i n e s sc u s t o m si nJ a p a nh a db e e nf o r m e do nt h ep r e m i s et h a tl a n dp r i c e sn e v e rf a l l .
How to deal with the losses when land prices declined was an unprecedented problem
for the economy. Japan had a legal and social system of bankruptcy procedures that
worked well until the beginning of the 1990s. The continuous decline of land prices, how-
ever, changed the fundamental environment of bankruptcy practices and consequently
increased uncertainty concerning the outcome of bankruptcy procedures.
Currency crises in developing countries may introduce a similar uncertainty into
domestic economies. Before the crisis, there may be no economic institutions in those
countries able to cope with the business and banking failures associated with currency
devaluation under large external debts. Business failures arising from external debt
problems are usually unprecedented in these countries. And the bankruptcy systems do
not seem to function very well in resolving defaults caused by unprecedented external
debts.
Literature There is a rich literature on inaction and delay. For example, Sturzeneg-
ger and Tommasi (1998) categorize theories of delayed reform into the war-of-attrition
approach (Alesina and Drazen, 1991) and the uncertainty-about-net-beneﬁts approach
(Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). My story is quite diﬀerent from these approaches in
the following sense: Whereas the war-of-attrition and uncertainty-about-net-beneﬁts ap-
proaches explain the reason why a reform, which is already known to be beneﬁcial to
4society, is delayed, my story explains why a particular reform (resolution of failed banks
and ﬁrms), which is not obviously beneﬁcial to society, is in fact welfare enhancing. The
resolution of bankrupt banks and ﬁrms is not obviously welfare-enhancing, but its high
social cost is clearly evident. This is one of the reasons why forbearance policy has
been widely supported in Japan. This paper provides one theoretical account of why the
resolution of bankruptcy is necessary to restore economic growth; in existing literature,
the reform is merely assumed to restore economic growth. In this paper, the delay of
reform occurs because the government does not understand the mechanism by which
the reform restores economic growth, while in the existing literature, the delay is due to
coordination failure among economic agents.
The organization of this paper is as follows: In the next section I present the basic
structure of the model and show that there are multiple equilibria: a good equilibrium
and a bad one. In Section 3 I describe a ﬁnancial crisis hitting an economy that was
originally in a good equilibrium, and a restoration of conﬁdence by Bayesian learning.
Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
2M o d e l
The model is quite stylized so that it can be used to describe the main idea with simple
mathematics. In Section 2.1 I show the basic structure in a partial equilibrium setting
where asset prices are given exogenously. In Section 2.2 I describe the general equilibrium
in which asset prices are determined as an equilibrium outcome.
2.1 Baseline
Although the economy is the inﬁnite-horizon economy where time discretely extends
from zero to inﬁnity: t =0 ,1,2,···, t h em a i ni d e ac a nb es h o w ni nao n e - p e r i o ds e t t i n g .
An inﬁnite-period setting becomes necessary when I describe the determination of asset
prices in the next subsection. Therefore, in this subsection, I focus on decision making
in a single period. The economy consists of many ﬁrms (potential debtors), many banks
5(potential creditors), and a benevolent government. The numbers of ﬁrms and banks are
equal: M (À 1).
Technologies A ﬁrm lives for inﬁnite periods. At date 0, each ﬁrm is endowed with
one unit of land. The land is nondepletable and tradable, and it generates consumer
goods at each date in accordance with the safe or risky production technology described
below. At each date the ﬁrm is endowed with one unit of private goods, which gives the
same utility to the owner ﬁrm as one unit of consumer goods, but it can give no utility
to other ﬁrms or banks. (The private goods are nontradable and the consumer goods
are tradable.) Private goods can be (partially) converted to consumer goods only in the
bankruptcy procedure described below. In this subsection I assume that the land price
Q i nt e r m so fc o n s u m e rg o o d si sg i v e ne x o g e n o u s l y ,a n dt h a tQ takes the value of either
QH or QL (QH >Q L). There are two production technologies available to ﬁrms at each
date: S (safe) and R (risky). If the ﬁrm chooses technology S, one unit of its land yields
yL (> 0) units of consumer goods. Land is the only input for technology S, and the ﬁrm
need not borrow from a bank. If the ﬁrm chooses technology R, it must provide m units
of consumer goods as input to one unit of its land. In that case, the one unit of land
yields yH with probability p and yields nothing with probability 1−p. I assume that the
parameters satisfy the following condition:
pyH >y L + m. (1)
I assume the following restriction on technology R:
Assumption 1 A ﬁrm must borrow input m from a bank. The only contract that a ﬁrm
and a bank can make is a debt contract with ﬁxed repayment.
The above restriction on ﬁnancial contracts can be justiﬁed by a standard assumption of
asymmetric information: The bank cannot observe or verify the outcome of technology
R unless it engages in costly monitoring of the ﬁrm (see, for example, Gale and Hellwig
[1985]). Although it would be necessary to incorporate the monitoring cost explicitly to
derive risky debt as the endogenously chosen contract, I simply postulate Assumption 1
in order to avoid unnecessary complications in the following analysis.
6I assume that after production the ﬁrms and banks sell and buy the land at price Q in
the land market. Therefore, when the ﬁrm utilizes technology R and fails, it can sell its
land to repay the bank. But it may be impossible for the ﬁrm to repay the full amount of
its debt if the land price is low: QL. Suppose that some amount of debt remains unpaid
even after the debtor sells all of its own land. I deﬁne this situation as default. If a debtor
defaults on its debt, the government (or the court) can start bankruptcy proceedings.
Assumption 2 In the bankruptcy proceedings, the government transforms θ units of
the private goods of the defaulter into consumer goods and gives them to the creditor.
The value of θ (0 < θ < 1)i su n k n o w nt oﬁrms, banks, and the government, while the
probability distribution of θ is known at date 0. The moments are also known at date 0:
E(θ)=µ, and V (θ)=ν.
The value of θ is revealed only to the defaulter and the creditor during the bankruptcy
proceedings, and is not observable to the public even after the proceedings.
That the parameter θ is unknown represents an intrinsic and technological risk in the
economy.1
Insurance In order to simplify mathematical exposition of the following analysis, es-
pecially that in Section 3, I posit that ﬁrms form (several) groups, each of which consists
of a suﬃcient number of ﬁrms who establish equitable insurance among themselves as
a group to cover the risk of technology R. Note that they cannot write a contract con-
tingent on θ, but, if necessary, they can write an insurance contract contingent on the
event of default or bankruptcy knowing that E(θ)=µ and V (θ)=ν. But I simply
posit that ﬁrms in a group share consumer goods (not private goods) and land equally,
after the output of technology R is realized, and trading of land is complete. The most
1This assumption does not necessarily imply that a bankruptcy is an unprecedented event in this
economy. It can be postulated that, observing bankruptcies, the economic agents have updated the prior
over θ by the Bayesian rule described in Section 3. The prior of θ in Assumption 2 can be interpreted as
a result of the Bayesian learning that has taken place until date 0.
7i m p o r t a n tr o l eo ft h ei n s u r a n c es y s t e mi st h a ti tg u a r a n t e e st h a taﬁrm owns one unit of
land at the beginning of the next period even if it undertakes technology R and fails in
the current period. This is because if a ﬁrm undertakes technology R and fails, it sells its
land to another ﬁrm; since total amount of land in this economy stays constant, the fair
insurance guarantees that each ﬁrm has one unit of land after the payoﬀ of the insurance.
Without this insurance system, the heterogeneity of landownership among ﬁrms would
complicate the dynamic analysis, without changing basic intuition of my model.2
Firms Given that ﬁrms will form fair insurance if they adopt technology R, a ﬁrm
maximizes the following (ﬂow) utility:
uF = E(cf)+E(1 − 1d · θ) − γV (1 − 1d · θ)=E(cf) − E(1d · θ) − γV (1d · θ)+1 , (2)
where cf is the consumer goods, and 1d = 1 if default occurs and 1d = 0 if default does
not occur. I assume that the ﬁrm obtains utility from its consumption of the consumer
goods (cf) and private goods (1 − 1d · θ), while the ﬁrm exhibits risk-aversion only
toward the private goods, which is formalized as the third term (−γV [1−1d ·θ]). These
nonstandard assumptions that the ﬁrm is risk-averse only toward private goods and that
risk-aversion is formalized as the deduction of the variance V (1d · θ)a r ei n t r o d u c e dt o
simplify the mathematics needed to analyze the model. The main results of this paper
will hold under a more general setting.
Banks Ab a n kl i v e sf o ri n ﬁnite periods. At each date, each bank is endowed with m
units of consumer goods. The bank can either consume m or lend m to a ﬁrm as the
input for production. I assume that the bank is risk-neutral and maximizes the following
ﬂow utility:
uB = E(cb)+E(1d · θ), (3)
2By introducing insurance among ﬁrms, I slightly abuse the notion that a ﬁrm is an atomistic price-
taker. A group of ﬁrms collectively chooses technology S or R, and forms the fair insurance, given the
asset price Q. This collective action does not induce any strategic or monopolistic problems in this
economy where agents have simple technologies.
8where cb = m i nt h ec a s ew h e r et h eb a n kc o n s u m e si t se n d o w m e n t ,a n dcb is the repay-
ment in the case where it lends m to the ﬁrm.
Multiple equilibria It is shown that under appropriate parameter values, technology
R prevails if the land price is QH, and technology S prevails if the land price is QL.F i r s t
consider the optimal debt contract between a ﬁrm and a bank when the ﬁrm adopts
technology R. I assume that the ﬁrm has the full bargaining power to decide the amount
of repayment r for the borrowing of m.T h u sr is determined by
minr
subject to 
    





r, (with probability p)
min{r,Q} (with probability 1 − p),
uB ≥ m.
Ia s s u m et h a tQL is so small and QH is so large that the solution to the above problem
r(Q)s a t i s ﬁes
QL <r (QL)a n dr(QH) <Q H. (4)
This condition is veriﬁed in the general equilibrium setting in the next subsection. Sup-
pose that Q = QH. In this case, no default occurs even if the ﬁrm adopts technology R
and then fails. Thus the solution is r(QH)=m.S u p p o s e t h a t Q = QL.I n t h i s c a s e ,
default occurs if the ﬁrm adopts technology R and fails. The solution is
r(QL)=p−1{m − (1 − p)(QL + µ)}. (5)
If Q = QH and ﬁrms adopt technology R, the expected value (in terms of consumer
goods) of the sum of the output and landholding for a ﬁrm is p·(yH −r(QH)+Q)+(1−
p)(Q − r(QH)) = pyH − m + Q. The insurance system ensures that each ﬁrm obtains
pyH − m units of the consumer good and 1 unit of land. Therefore, when Q = QH,t h e
expected utility of a ﬁrm becomes uF = pyH − m + 1 if it adopts technology R, while
uF = yL + 1 if it chooses technology S. Condition (1) implies that uF is maximized if
ﬁrms choose technology R. Therefore, all ﬁrms choose technology R if Q = QH.
9If Q = QL and ﬁrms adopt technology R, the expected value of the output and
landholding is p·(yH −r(QL)+Q)+(1−p)·0=pyH −m+(1−p)µ+Q.T h ei n s u r a n c e
system ensures that each ﬁrm obtains pyH − m +( 1− p)µ units of the consumer good
and 1 unit of land. In this case, since a ﬁrm goes bankrupt when it adopts technology R
and fails, uF = cf +1− (1 − p)µ − (1 − p)γν = pyH − m +1− (1 − p)γν. I assume the
following condition for the parameters:
pyH − m − (1 − p)γν <y L <p y H − m. (6)
Under this assumption, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ choosing technology S than technology R.
Thus ﬁrms choose technology S if Q = QL.I th a sbe e ns h o w nt h a tt h e r ea r et w oe q u i l i b r i a
in this economy: a good equilibrium where the average output is high (pyH − m)a n d
t h ea s s e tp r i c ei sh i g h( QH), and a bad equilibrium where the output is low (yL)a n dt h e
asset price is low (QL).
Conﬁdence recovery The above argument shows that the uncertainty about θ and
the risk-aversion of the ﬁrms make them choose low productive technology under low
asset prices. If the value of θ is revealed, then V (θ) becomes zero. It is obvious that
if V (θ)=0 ,t h eﬁrms choose high productive technology (technology R) even under
low asset prices. Therefore, if θ is revealed, the ﬁrms always choose technology R, and
the average output is always high. That ﬁrms become willing to choose the high-risk,
high-return technology can be interpreted as the recovery of conﬁdence in the business
environment. In this model, the resolution of uncertainty (i.e., revelation of θ)b r i n g s
about the recovery of conﬁdence. In Section 3, I introduce the Bayesian learning rule
for θ and describe how government forbearance hinders the revelation of θ,r e s u l t i n gi n
prolonging of the bad equilibrium.
2.2 General Equilibrium
In order to complete the model, we need to specify how the land price Q is determined.
To determine this asset price, we need to generalize the model into a multiperiod setting.
10Time continues from zero to inﬁnity: t =0 ,1,2,···.R e d e ﬁne uF as uF
t and uB as uB
t .I








Here, β (0 < β < 1) is the discount factor. I assume that banks have the same discount








Since the ﬁr m ss e l la n db u yl a n dw i t he a c ho t h e r ,t h ep r i c eo fl a n d( i nt e r m so ft h e
consumer goods) is determined as the discounted sum of the net production of the land,
w h i c hi sd i s c o u n t e db yβ. Thus if technology R prevails in the economy, the land price
is




If technology S prevails in the economy, the land price is




I assume two conditions for the parameter values:
(β−1 − 1)m<p y H − m, (9)
yL
β−1 − 1
+( 1− p)µ<m . (10)
These conditions ensure that default never occurs if Q = QH, and that default occurs
if Q = QL and the ﬁrm adopts technology R and fails. Therefore, if conditions (9) and
(10) hold, the results in Section 2.1 still hold in the general equilibrium setting where the
asset prices (QH and QL) are determined by (7) and (8): There exist a good equilibrium
where the average output (pyH − m)a n dt h ea s s e tp r i c e( QH)a r eh i g h ,a n dab a d
equilibrium where the average output (yL)a n dt h ea s s e tp r i c e( QL)a r el o w .N o t et h a t
no default occurs either in the good equilibrium or in the bad equilibrium. Thus in either
equilibrium, the true value of θ is never revealed if it is not known at the initial date.
113 Crisis and Forbearance
In the stationary equilibria where the asset price is constant (QH or QL) for all t,t h e r e
is no default and thus θ is never revealed. In this subsection, we examine the case where
the asset price is changed by an exogenous macroeconomic shock.
Financial crisis Suppose that the economy is initially at the good equilibrium and
that it is suddenly hit by a ﬁnancial crisis at time τ.T h eﬁnancial crisis consists of the
following three events: (a) outputs are destroyed for N ﬁrms (1 ¿ N ≤ M), (b) the land
price suddenly falls from QH to QL, and (c) pessimism prevails that the land price will
remain at QL from date τ onward. As a result, N ﬁrms default on their debt obligations
at τ because all ﬁrms chose technology R at date τ − 1. I assume that
(M − N)yH > (M − N)m + NQL. (11)
At date τ, a bank obtains on average (1 − N
M)m + N
MQL units of consumer goods, since
they set r = m at date τ − 1. Since land is sold to ﬁrms, a ﬁrm obtains one unit of land
and (1 − N
M)(yH − m) − N
MQL(> 0) units of consumer goods (see (11)). The insurance
among ﬁrms guarantees that each of the ﬁrms, including N defaulters, owns one unit of
land at the beginning of date τ +1. The transfer of private goods remains to be done in
the bankruptcy proceedings.
Forbearance In the multiperiod setting in this section, I assume the government wants
to postpone bankruptcy proceedings. Postponement of the proceedings is a model of
forbearance by the government that is often observed when a country is hit by a ﬁnancial
crisis. In a country where corporate accounting standards and banking regulation are
loose, the government can postpone recognizing bank insolvency for a long period after
the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis, and the loose practices of bank regulation and corporate
accounting enable banks to continue extending credits to de facto bankrupt debtors,
resulting in the postponement of the bankruptcy of failed ﬁrms.3 For example, this
3The postponement may be feasible without cost if bank regulation is loose, because banks can create
credits by lending bank deposits (not cash).
12postponement was observed in the 1990s in Japan. After the crash of land prices at the
beginning of the 1990s, the Japanese bank regulators chose a forbearance policy, and
banks continued lending to de facto insolvent debtors. The evidence of the forbearance
is seen in the amounts of bank lending: The total lending to problem sectors (real
estate, construction, retail, and nonbank ﬁnancial industries) increased in the 1990s.
While Japan is just one example, an increase of bank lending after the onset of a crisis
has commonly been observed in recent banking crises (Boyd et al., 2001). In order to
introduce forbearance, I assume the following:
Assumption 3 The government can undertake bankruptcy proceedings for the N de-
faulters in a ﬁnancial crisis at any date τ +t where t ≥ 0. For an ordinary default after
the ﬁnancial crisis, the government undertakes bankruptcy proceedings immediately (As-
sumption 2). The value of θ (0 < θ < 1)i su n k n o w n ,w h i l et h ep r o b a b i l i t yd i s t r i b u t i o n




0 xa−1(1 − x)b−1dx
,
where a>1 and b>1.
The property of the beta distribution (see, for example, Hartigan [1983], pp.76—78) im-




, and V (θ)=ν ≡
ab
(a + b +1 ) ( a + b)2.
Therefore, I assume that the parameters a and b satisfy conditions (6) and (10). Since
each ﬁrm owns one unit of land from date τ +1onward,N defaulters continue operating
just like healthy ﬁrms until the government undertakes their bankruptcy proceedings.
Bayesian learning I introduce the Bayesian learning rule for the value of θ.Ia s s u m e
that even if a bankruptcy proceeding is completed, the true value of θ is not revealed to
the public; it becomes known only to the defaulter and its creditor after the proceedings.
Instead of the true value of θ, a signal ω that indicates the value of θ is given to the
public after the bankruptcy proceeding is over. I assume the following:
13Assumption 4 The exact value of θ is never revealed to the public. A signal ω is given
to the public when a bankruptcy proceeding is over, where ω =1with probability θ and
ω =0with probability 1 − θ.
The random variable ω can be interpreted as information on which side wins the pro-
ceeding: Whether the creditor wins (ω = 1) or the defaulter wins (ω =0 ) . ( A l t h o u g h
it may seem peculiar to readers, I assume for simplicity that the amount of transfer θ is
not aﬀected by which side wins bankruptcy proceedings.) Let the number of bankruptcy
proceedings that are completed by date τ +t be nt.( 0≤ nt ≤ N.) In the period between
date τ and date τ + t, ﬁrms and banks observe signals ωi (i =1 ,2,···,n t). Firms and
banks utilizes the information {ωi} to estimate the value of θ.S u p p o s et h a tω =1f o rst
cases of bankruptcy and ω =0f o rvt cases of bankruptcy (st + vt = nt). The ﬁrms and




0 xs(1 − x)vf(x)dx
. (12)
Therefore, at date τ + t the random variable θ follows the beta distribution with p.d.f.
f(θ;st,v t), and has the following moments:
E(θ|st,v t)=
st + a
nt + a + b
, and V (θ|st,v t)=
(st + a)(vt + b)
(nt + a + b +1 ) ( nt + a + b)2.
Thus limnt→∞ V (θ|st,v t)=0f o ra l la and b that satisfy a ≥ 1a n db ≥ 1. The law of
large numbers implies that E(θ|st,v t)c o n v e r g e st oθ∗ where θ∗ i st h et r u ev a l u eo fθ.
Therefore, the prior f(θ;st,v t) converges to the point distribution that Pr{θ = θ∗} =1a s
nt goes to inﬁnity. In this sense, ﬁrms and banks can learn the true value θ∗ by Bayesian
learning based on the observations of bankruptcies if there are a suﬃcient number of
defaults at date τ. Thus I assume the following for N, the total number of defaults at
date τ.
Assumption 5 T h en u m b e ro fd e f a u l t e r sN i sl a r g ee n o u g ht os a t i s f y
yL <p y H − m − γ(1 − p)
(N + a)(N + b)
(N + a + b +1 ) ( N + a + b)2.
14Condition (6) guarantees that a suﬃciently large integer N satisﬁes Assumption 5. This
assumption guarantees that if bankruptcy proceedings for all default cases are complete,
t h ev a r i a n c eo fθ under the updated p.d.f. becomes so small that uF = pyH − m − (1 −
p)V (θ|s,v) + 1 is larger than yL +1 ,a n da l lﬁrms choose technology R even under the
low asset price (QL). Thus if the number of bankruptcy proceedings becomes large as
time passes, the bad equilibrium vanishes at some point and the economy jumps to the
good equilibrium, in which production and asset prices are high.4
Forbearance impedes conﬁdence recovery A bankruptcy usually generates social
costs associated with the transfer of resources. I assume the government incurs a very
s m a l ls o c i a lc o s tΨ(b)w h e ni tu n d e r t a k e sb cases of bankruptcy proceedings. The govern-
ment decides the schedule of bankrupcty proceedings: {bt}∞
t=0,w h e r ebt ≡ nt−nt−1 is the
number of bankruptcy proceedings undertaken at date τ +t. The objective of this benev-


















where yτ+t = yL if technology S is adopted, and yτ+t = pyH − m if technology R is
adopted. Note that the insurance among ﬁrms gives the same share of output to all
ﬁrms. Since the insurance among ﬁr m sg u a r a n t e e st h a te a c hﬁrm owns one unit of land
at each date, the ﬁrm’s choice problem of technology S or R in this multiperiod setting
is reduced to a single period problem described in Section 2.1. Therefore, given that
the government determines the schedule {bt}∞
t=1, the equilibrium price {Qτ+t}∞
t=1 and
production {yτ+t}∞







4The earlier version of this paper (Kobayashi, 2002) demonstrates almost identical results using the
Knightian uncertainty on priors over θ. In that paper, debt is repaid in full with probability θ in
the bankruptcy procedure. The Knightian uncertainty is modeled ` al aG i l b o aa n dS c h m e i d l e r( 1 9 8 9 ) ;
θ is unknown and the economic agents have multiple priors over θ; they are assumed to maximize
the minimum expected utility over the multiple priors; and, observing the outcomes of bankruptcy





pyH − m, if Qτ+t >r τ+t or pyH − m − (1 − p)V (θ|sτ+t,v τ+t) >y L,
yL, if Qτ+t <r τ+t and pyH − m − (1 − p)V (θ|sτ+t,v τ+t) ≤ yL,
(14)
where rτ+t = p−1{m − (1 − p)(Qτ+t + E[θ|sτ+t,v τ+t])}. If the government understands
that ﬁrms and banks update E(θ|s,v)a n dV (θ|s,v) by the Bayesian learning rule de-
scribed above, it undertakes all N bankruptcy proceedings at date τ in order to enhance
t h eB a y e s i a nu p d a t eo fθ, resulting in the switch in prevalent production technology
from low productivity (technology S) to high productivity (technology R). The proof
of this statement is straightforward: If N bankruptcy proceedings are undertaken at τ,
Assumption 5 and equation (14) imply that ﬁrms undertake technology R even under
the pessimism that Qτ+t = QL,a n dt h a tyτ+t = pyH − m for all t ≥ 1. Then equation
(13) implies that Qτ+t = QH for all t ≥ 1; therefore, immediate resolution of failed





1−β(pyH +1 )− Ψ(N), since there are no defaults in the
good equilibrium. Assuming that Ψ(N)i ss u ﬃciently small compared with pyH−yL−m,
social welfare is maximized by immediate bankruptcies of N defaulters.
But in reality, the government may regard the recovery of conﬁdence as an exogenous
event to its own actions. If the government assumes that private agents do not learn from
its own actions, i.e., E(θ|s,v)a n dV (θ|s,v) in equation (14) do not depend on {st,v t},
then it will postpone bankruptcy proceedings forever, since UF
τ + UB
τ is perceived by
the government as exogenous to its actions, while Ψ(bt)i si n c r e a s i n gw i t ht h en u m b e ro f
bankruptcy proceedings undertaken. In this case, E(θ|s,v)=µ and V (θ|s,v)=ν for all
τ +t,a n dﬁrms choose technology S under the pessimism that Qτ+t = QL;e q u a t i o n( 1 3 )
implies that Qτ+t = QL, thereby validates the pessimism; the economy will be stuck in
the bad equilibrium forever.
4 Conclusion
I have analyzed a simple model of stagnation following a ﬁnancial crisis, in which the
government’s forbearance policy hinders the Bayesian learning of private agents. Asset
16prices and outputs stagnate, since agents cannot build conﬁdence through learning. If
the government endogenizes the eﬀect of its own actions on learning by private agents, it
can choose the optimal schedule of reform, i.e., a fast bankruptcy schedule for those who
fail during a ﬁnancial crisis. In other words, after an economic crisis, the restructuring of
failed businesses may promote economic growth through the enhancement of conﬁdence-
building.
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